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Interpreting the Legal Archive of Visual Transfor-
mations: Textual Articulations of Visibility in Evi-
dentiary Procedures and Documentary Formats of 
Colonial Law 
 
Asif Ali Akhtar 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This essay is concerned with tracing an onto-epistemological break through the 
archaeology of colonial penal law, whereby a historical restructuring of the “visi-
ble” and the “articulable” produces modern ways of “seeing” and “knowing.” This 
epistemic break will be investigated through eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
“Regulations” of Islamic sharīʿa penal law by British administrators of the East 
India Company in colonial Bengal.1 The juridico-discursive body, which came to 
be known as Anglo-Muhammadan law, is analyzed through court records com-
piled by Company jurists and their Regulations modifying sharīʿa jurisprudence. 
Islamic penal law is based on hermeneutical practices of juridical reasoning formed 
through particular ways of seeing, knowing, and verifying the truth through eye-
witness and testimony. In this essay I show that when the British commandeered 
this system of justice toward their own ends, the regulatory changes they instituted 
inadvertently brought about visual transformations of the ways in which legal life-
worlds of the colony come to be recorded, articulated, and expressed. Under the 
British administration of colonial Bengal, this dual-process of appropriation and 
subversion of the law took shape through translation and transliteration of fiqh 
treatises, to legal amendments and sweeping legislations in substantive law.2 This 
process not only provided colonial power access to the bodies of colonial subjects 
but also conditioned the relations between criminality, visuality, and juridical 
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veridiction through penal legislation.3 As this essay shows, the East India Com-
pany’s regulation of Islamic penal law began incorporating modern forms of evi-
dentiary proofs, indexicality, and documentary formats that restructured the life-
world of colonial law in nineteenth-century Bengal.  
I approach these complex changes by looking at the Nizāmat ʻAdālat, a 
superior criminal court of judicature operating in Bengal from the late eighteenth 
to mid-nineteenth century. I approach the Nizāmat system through court records 
produced by East India Company servants from 1805 to 1859, titled Reports of Cases 
Determined in the Court of Nizamut Adawlut.4 Treating these Reports as the primary 
object of analysis, I show how they provide lucid insights into the visual res-truc-
turing of law and life in the colony. Changes in the substantive and procedural law, 
which affected epistemological bases, hermeneutical practices, and veridic-tional 
procedures of sharīʿa law, were enacted by the British through a series of Regula-
tions that constituted new types of evidentiary rules and documentary proc-edures. 
By regulatory enactment, “criminal sentences [were] to be prepared from com-
mencement of 1805, for the information of government…and cases of importance 
to be selected from such reports for publication.”5 This legislation eventually ma-
terialized in the Reports, whose format and documentary features provide vivid in-
sights into the changing nature of legality and penality, evidencing what I argue is 
an epistemic break restructuring the visible and articulable lifeworld of law.  
 In considering eighteenth- and nineteenth-century penal law discourses 
and practices, this essay theoretically and methodologically draws on the work of 
Michel Foucault, along with his understanding of history in terms of epistemolog-
ical breaks and regimes of truth.6 Conversely, the colonial legalscape provides a 
different view—and a different empirical substrata—than the discourses of the 
classical age of European modernity commonly associated with Foucault’s re-
searches. In apprehending historical epochs and past systems of legality and pe-
nality in terms of the “visible” and the “articulable,” this work also gestures to the 
direction of how Gilles Deleuze has refracted certain aspects of Foucault’s con-
ceptions of discourses and practices to view them in a different light. To quote 
from Deleuze’s Foucault:  
  
An ‘age’ does not pre-exist the statements which express it, nor the 
visibilities which fill it. These are the two essential aspects: on the 
one hand each stratum or historical formation implies a distrib-
ution of the visible and the articulable which acts upon itself; on 
the other, from one stratum to the next there is a variation in the 
distribution, because the visibility itself changes in style, while the 
statements themselves change their system.7  
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Viewed in this light, the Reports of criminal law cases—judged by Company 
jurists together with their Mahomedan law officers—under consideration in the 
following sections illuminate how the changing onto-epistemological modalities of 
colonial law also restructured ways of seeing, saying, and knowing in colonial Ben-
gal. The changing epistemological modalities, it will be argued, also have bearing 
on how visibilities of law come to be restructured and conditioned through emerg-
ing modern evidentiary frames, documentary formats, and recording tech-niques 
of colonial law.  
To evidence a rupture—in terms of the visible and the articulable—bet-
ween the Islamic premodern and the colonial modernity, the Reports are treated as 
an archive of visual and legal transformations. The discursive residue in the form 
and content of the Reports elucidates an onto-epistemological break in terms of 
shifting evidentiary modes, documentary formats, and means of determining the 
truth. The visibilities apparent in the colonial penal law are treated on two levels: 
first, at the level of the “discursive residue” of the Reports themselves—their ma-
teriality, format, and indexicality of the court records—in terms of what cues they 
provide as an archive into visual transformations underway; and second, at the 
level of evidentiary and documentary transformations discernible from their con-
tent, in terms of changing epistemologies and truth-procedures. Over the course 
of the early nineteenth century, the focus of the legal records shifts from eviden-
tiary rules of sharīʿa jurisprudence toward medico-juridical and forensic techniques. 
Eyewitness testimonies and attention to the instrument of murder come to be re-
placed with documents such as crime scene reports, postmortem reports, and au-
topsy reports. These changes, it will be argued, produce different ways of seeing 
and attesting to the truth, while the transforming relations of the visible to the 
articulable become discernible through a continuous recording of early nineteenth-
century colonial penal law crystallized in the Reports as a unique archive of where 
the colonial gaze meets the colonized body. 
 Considering the case records contained in these volumes of the Reports in 
relation to the periodic Regulations, I show how this “discursive residue” of an 
antecedent legal system forms an archive not only of legal change but also of visual 
transformations. Part 1 of this essay establishes a historical and institutional con-
text of the Nizāmat ʻAdālat and its regulatory modes necessary for interpreting the 
Reports. Part 2 delineates certain visual features of the Reports in terms of formatting 
and indexing, which make them useful as an archive of visual change. Finally, part 
3 considers how the Reports elucidate an onto-epistemological break in terms of 
evidentiary modes, documentary formats, and truth-procedures, which evidence a 
rupture between the Islamic premodern and the colonial modernity that follows. 
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Preliminary Context: Historical Strata of Colonial Regulation of Islamic Law 
 
Prior to the onset of colonial modernity, Bengal, the largest province of the 
Mughal dominion, was administered by the dual system of a Nâzım (governor) and 
a Dīwān (treasurer). While the Diwani was the domain of commerce and treasury, 
the Nizāmat was properly the administrational domain under the figure of the 
Nâzım—though these spheres often intersected.8 According to a decentralized 
mode of Mughal criminal adjudication, every village had its local qadi, or judge, 
who “had criminal jurisdiction along with other jurisdictions.” Further, “a Mufti 
was attached to every court,” where each qadi would pronounce judgment in con-
sultation with a mufti, or jurisconsult.9 In the mid-eighteenth century, as the East 
India Company gained influence in the region, its initial foray was into the realm 
of the Dīwān, where they took on responsibilities for taxation and civil litigation 
under a reconstituted Sadr Dīwānī ʿAdālat. Meanwhile, the Sadr Nizāmat ʿAdālat 
was left under the auspices of the Nawab of Bengal up until the 1757 battle of 
Plassey. As Tapus Kumar Banerjee notes, “After Plassey, nothing remained to the 
Nawab but the ‘Name and Shadow of Authority’, and the Company could [also] 
usurp the powers and functions of the Nizamat.”10 Although there is a rich history 
of how this usurpation takes place during the time of Warren Hastings,11 the period 
that concerns the current discussion of court records stems from the formalization 
of a new type of codified institution in 1790 following the Regulations initiated by 
the incoming Governor General, Marquis Cornwallis. 
 
 
Cornwallis’s Minute on Defects of Muhammadan Law and Its Colonial Regulation 
 
In 1790 Marquis Cornwallis ushered in a new phase of the British administration 
of criminal justice in Bengal. The East India Company had engaged in various 
experiments of influencing criminal law, from 1765 on through a policy of nonin-
terference, and indirect rule through the office of the Naib Nâzım. The end of this 
period came in 1790, when “the Company took the control of the Nizāmat into its 
own hands, and the veil was removed.”12 In a Minute recorded at Fort William on 
December 1, 1790, Cornwallis noted two obvious causes for the notoriously de-
fective system: “1st, the gross defects in the Mohummudan law; and 2ndly, The 
defects in the constitution of the courts established.”13 While the British had al-
ready altered significant parts of the law and the institutions in the decades prior, 
Cornwallis ushered in an era of systematic and codified changes to the sharīʿa law 
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that would come to be properly known as the Regulations. The rationale behind 
these Regulations was to correct the “defects in the penal laws of the country” 
while instituting “an efficient administration of criminal justice.”14 Consequently, 
by 1793 Cornwallis “formed the Regulations into a regular Code, [as] the basis of 
the Regulation Law.”15 The Regulations of the Bengal Presidency are of crucial 
importance in understanding the British administration of criminal law in India up 
to 1859 as documented in the Reports. These properly formed the template for later 
applications in other areas up until the passage of the Indian Penal Code Act in 
1860. 
As sharīʿa law functions on the basis of specific hermeneutic and commen-
tary discourses, the Regulations provided a means for the British to make altera-
tions to the substantive law from without.16 As a series of legislative acts aimed at 
rescinding, altering, abrogating, mutating, and subverting the existing law, the Reg-
ulations can thus be properly considered a counter-discursive body of law acting in 
reference to and poised against the existing evidentiary rules and hermeneutical 
procedures of sharīʿa jurisprudence.17 Prior to 1790, British amen-dments of the 
law were cautious yet arbitrary and unsystematic; later on, they systematically un-
render the sharīʿa through codification.18 The complex procedure, whereby one 
format of law rewrites, or codifies an existing legal system, it is argued, is what 
produces legal modernity together with new modes of seeing and knowing as evi-
denced in the Reports. 
 To illustrate the point about how the Regulations can be used to interpret 
visual change taking place in the Reports, I provide an example of a single but form-
ative Regulation, which came to significantly restructure criminal jurisprudence. 
The Regulation in question stems from Cornwallis’s remarks recorded in his Mi-
nute on the matter of evidence in homicide cases.19 The law officers writing the 
fatwas would refer, in lieu of Abu Hanifa’s emphasis on determining the intention 
from the nature of the instrument deployed, to “more modern authorities” of Abu 
Yusuf and Muhammad al-Shaybani, who stress intentionality should be deter-
mined from circumstantial evidence.20 The effects of this Regulation in terms of 
visuality of evidentiary criteria and how visual cues are laid out in the Reports are 
considered in the final section. The statement from Cornwallis’s 1790 Minute, 
which makes the stipulation to consider the intent of the murderer and not the 
instrument of murder in homicide investigations, is reproduced for context: 
 
“1st. That the doctrine of Yusuf and Mohummud, in respect to 
trials for murder, be the general rule for the officers of the courts 
to write the Futwas or law opinions applicable to the circumstances 
of every trial, and that the distinctions made by Aboo Huneefa as 
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to the mode of the commission of murder, be no longer attended 
to; or in other words, that the intention of the criminal, either evi-
dently or fairly inferrible from the nature and circumstances of the 
case, and not the manner or instrument of perpetration (except as 
evidence of the intent) do constitute the rule for determining the 
punishment; …we have it in evidence before us that the best sub-
sequent, or more modern, law authorities among the Mohummu-
dans, do expressly, in cases where Aboo Huneefa and his said two 
disciples differ, leave it to the Hakim, or ruling power, to make an 
option between their varying sentiments; upon which ground I 
think it is plainly our duty to adopt, in all such cases, the opinion 
of either that shall appear most rational and fitted to promote the 
due and impartial administration of justice.”21   
 
 Harington notes that Cornwallis’s remarks “were accordingly included in 
a Regulation, of fifty-two articles,” passed two days later. We may note in this 
instance how Cornwallis’s utterance at Fort Williams becomes enacted and codi-
fied into law as Regulations. This points to the institutionalization of a hitherto-
unprecedented discourse of legal amendments, requiring new types of evidence 
and new practices of punishment and correction to be invented. After 1805, the 
Reports provide vivid insights into how these Regulations functioned in terms of 
the articulability of the visible and how the focus shifts from eyewitness testimo-
nies and the instrument of murder to the corpse of the victim, marks of mutilation, 
and various other visually discernible circumstantial evidence. Before we turn to 
the Reports, understanding the procedure of the Nizāmat as administered by Com-
pany servants will add further context to interpret the form and content of the 
records.  
 
 
Institutional Structure and Function of the Nizāmat ʻAdālat post-1790 
 
As the Nizāmat is not a regular court of law, in order to fully appreciate the form 
and content of the Reports, the reader will benefit from a basic understanding of its 
institutional structure and function. A summary of this is provided by W. H. Mac-
naghten in the opening Advertisement for the first volume of the Reports: 
 
The chief peculiarity in the mode of proceeding in the Court of 
Nizamut Adawlut is, that the prisoners are never personally before 
it. Judgement in each case is formed by a perusal of the original 
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proceedings of the Magistrates on the commitments, and copies of 
the proceedings held by the Courts of Circuit on the trials. The 
proceedings of the Courts of Circuit are ordered to be conducted 
in the following manner. The charge against the prisoner; his con-
fession, if he plead guilty; the evidence on the part of the prosecu-
tor; the prisoner’s defence, and any evidence which he may have 
to adduce, being all heard; the Cauzy or Moofty (who is present 
during the whole of the trial) writes at the end of the record of the 
proceedings (which record is in the Persian language) the futwa, or 
exposition of the Moohummudan law, applicable to the circum-
stances of the case, and attests it with his seal and signature.22  
 
 The court of the Nizāmat ʻAdālat was reconstituted, by Section 67, Regu-
lation IX, 1793, as a superior criminal court of appeals, and was relocated to Cal-
cutta from Murshidabad. Following the East India Company’s reordering of the 
legal system, the offices and responsibilities were hierarchized in an unprecedented 
manner, with British judges supervising Muhammadan law officers (1 Qadi, 1 Mufti, 
2 Maulavies, and 2 Muharrirs, i.e., Persian scribes) in the lower courts.23 While the 
newly reformed superior court of the Nizāmat ʻAdālat “consist[ed] of three judges, 
to be denominated respectively chief judge, and second and third judge…assisted 
by the head cauzee of Bengal…and by two moofties.” Later the number of judges 
would be increased to five, “all chosen from among the covenanted [British] serv-
ants of the Company.”24 This institutional edifice of hierarchical subordination and 
bureaucratic organization is one of the key aspects that truly sets Anglo-Muham-
madan law apart from any preceding practice of sharīʿa in the world.25 The figure 
of the qadi was completely redefined and subsequently displaced during the reor-
dering of this system. As Nizāmat judge J. H. Harington notes: “The judicial func-
tions, which appertained to the office of the cauzy-ul-cuzzat…under the Ma-
homedan government, have been discontinued since the establishment of courts 
of justice under the superintendence of British judges.”26 Thus the office of the 
qadi was no longer a judgeship; rather, it became subordinated as a clerical position 
of the “law officer.”27 Under this new categorization, the role of the qadi (judge) 
came to be collapsed with the mufti (jurisconsult) and maulavi (professor), jointly 
referred to as “Muhammadan law officers” in the Reports and Regulations. The law 
officers would be instrumental in the functioning of both courts, as Macnaghten 
notes:  
 
As soon as practicable after the conclusion of each [Circuit Court] 
trial, a counterpart of the record is transmitted to the Nizamut 
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Adawlut, accompanied with an English letter, stating the opinion 
of the Judge on the evidence adduced. The record includes the 
whole of the proceedings, with every examination and material pa-
per taken by or delivered into Court, and Persian translations of all 
examinations which may have been taken down in any other lan-
guage. The whole of the papers and proceedings received from the 
Magistrate upon the case referred, are also transmitted. On receipt 
of these proceedings, they are made over to the Kazee ool Koozat 
and Mooftees of the Nizamut Adawlut, who, in the first instance, 
are required to state their opinion in writing at the foot of the rec-
ord of each trial.28 
 
These law officers would themselves become disciplinary subjects, termi-
nable upon any misconduct. Further, “they were required to take and subscribe a 
retrospective oath, half-yearly,” attesting to the fact that they had performed their 
duties diligently and honestly in the service of the government.29 While the role of 
the law officers is occluded in the Reports, the “Rule for obtaining futwa of law 
officers” specified in Regulation 9, 1793, and Regulation 8, 1803, perhaps offers 
the most visible description of their role:  
 
The law officers of the nizamut adawlut are ordered to assemble at 
the office of the register three times in every week, or oftener if 
necessary. The register is to lay before them the Persian copies of 
proceedings upon trials referred by the courts of circuit to the ni-
zamut adawlut; after duly considering which, and previously to 
leaving the register’s office, they are to state in writing, at the foot 
of the record upon each trial, whether the futwa of the law officer 
of the court of circuit is consistent with the evidence, and con-
formable to the Mohummudan law; or the futwa which, in their 
opinion, ought to be delivered upon the case; and are to subscribe 
their names, and affix their seals thereto. The register is to submit 
the proceedings so revised to the judges of the nizamut adawlut at 
their next meeting; and the court after presenting the proceedings 
of the court of circuit, with the futwas of the law officers of that 
court, and of the nizamut adawlut, are to pass the final sentence; 
unless further evidence or information upon any point appear req-
uisite…if further evidence be received, a second futwa is taken from 
the law officers, and the trial is again brought before the 
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court…the register is to transmit a copy of [the sentence], under 
the seal of the court, and attested with his official signature.30 
 
 Together these law officers would undertake the joint production of fatwas 
no longer as a hermeneutic practice but as a bureaucratic requirement of the Com-
pany courts. It should be noted that initially the fatwas are legally applicable to the 
parties in criminal case, regardless of their professed faith. For the proc-edures of 
the Nizāmat and the subordinate courts, the fatwas would function initially qua 
binding legal documents stating the law officer’s opinion on the matter31—gradu-
ally, through subsequent Regulations, these sealed and stamped fatwas would be-
come entirely dispensable. The judges of the Nizāmat would have supervisory au-
thority over the whole process and its documentation: 
 
The proceedings so revised are then submitted to the Judges of the 
Nizamut Adawlut, who may (and generally do) hold separate sit-
tings, and pass sentence, except in cases where the single Judge so 
sitting does not concur with the Judge of Circuit before whom the 
trial took place, or with the futwa of the Nizamut law officers, in 
which case the opinion of another Judge must be had before the 
sentence can be passed. Various regulations have from time to 
time, been passed with a view to remedy defects in the Moohum-
mudan law; and the opinion of the law officers may always be over-
ruled, whether on the side of the conviction or acquittal, by not 
less than two Judges of the Nizamut Adawlut.32 
 
Hence, from their centrally visible place in the legal system, the law officers and 
their fatwas eventually become erased from the process. Having outlined this pro-
cedure of how the Reports came to be compiled at the time, we may now attend to 
their form and content to understand changing evidentiary criteria in terms of how 
ways of seeing, showing, and saying are described within the legal process. The 
next section looks at the visual form of the records themselves, and the final section 
properly investigates marks of evidentiary change in the content of the Reports. 
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Figure 1 A Hindustani doctor’s deposition to the judge of the circuit court in Urdu. A question-
answer record of a conversation between the judge and the native doctor of the mental ward about 
the psychological disposition of a subject on trial, whether he was actually insane or feigning in-
sanity. An example of the documented medicalization, and changing procedures of the courts 
visually captured and crystalized in the court records. Niz ̤āmat ’Adālat, Reports of Cases 
Determined in the Court of Nizamut Adawlut [1831-1850], Calcutta: Bengal Military 
Orphan Press, 1841-1852. Image courtesy: British Library Board (IOR/V/22/445, p. 334-
335). 
 
 
Format and Visual Features of the Reports  
 
The Reports of Cases Determined in the Court of Nizamut Adawlut, reporting cases from 
January 1805 until the end of 1859, elucidate and occlude particular elements in 
their selective reporting criteria with changing times and formats.33 “It is not likely 
that the Nizamut Reports will be perused by any but those who are conversant 
with the system of proceeding observed in the Courts of Criminal Justice in this 
country,” wrote Macnaghten, the registrar of the Nizāmat when the first volume 
was published in 1827. It is unlikely that Macnaghten himself appreciated the 
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significance of the records he was compiling in terms of “discursive residue” being 
secreted, at the same time, for future observers of a dead legal system. I am referring 
here, more specifically, to historical researchers concerned with visual criteria and 
other aspects of nineteenth-century legal lifeworlds as different species of readers 
of court records—ones who approach and conceptualize the textual record and 
the colonial archive in different ways. For instance, here we are about to consider 
the Reports as a legal archive of visual transformations. “To those who peruse the 
following Reports,” Macnaghten notes,  
 
it cannot fail to be obvious, that much matter has been introduced 
unconnected with the principles laid down in the notes, and un-
necessary to the elucidation of the practice proposed to be estab-
lished. This is doubtless to be deprecated in some measure, as be-
ing a deviation from that perspicuous brevity which characterizes 
the reports of cases in crown law published in England. But a detail 
of the particulars developed in the criminal trials of this country 
cannot be regarded altogether as surplusage. According to Euro-
pean notions, the motives which here instigate the commission of 
offenses are sometimes inadequate, and not always comprehensi-
ble; and any information calculated to familiarize the Judge with 
the ideas and springs of action which prevail among those to whom 
he dispenses justice, cannot be wholly uninteresting or useless.34 
 
At the same time, Macnaghten notes elements that he himself has taken the liberty 
to occlude for the print format: 
 
It is a subject of regret to me, that the multifarious and incessant 
avocations of the Judges left them no leisure to revise their opin-
ions. These were probably written without any reference to their 
future appearance in print; and I have ventured to make a few ver-
bal alterations, where the style of the remark appeared clearly in-
tended for private reference, and obviously too colloquial for pub-
lication.35 
 
These statements attest to the colonial nature of a court through which 
foreigners dispense justice to natives by their own laws, while making modifica-
tions to rules, procedures, and practices that affect ways of seeing, saying, and 
knowing. What visual, indexical, and evidentiary insights can these records of a 
dead legal system offer into the lifeworlds of institutionalized legality and penality 
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experienced by historical subjects of colonial law? In this section, I attempt to 
review some of these visual and indexical features of the Reports that can lend 
themselves to attuned readers as a visual resource. 
 
 
Form and Formatting of the Reports 
 
The cases are reported chronologically in summarized form with headings bearing 
the prosecutor/prosecutrix versus the prisoner and the charge. There are changes 
to the format, as new types of evidence and documentation from the lower courts, 
police records, and medical examinations come to be included in the process of 
the trials; however, the general style and presentation remain almost constant until 
the end. These changes attest to changing evidentiary procedures. As noted above, 
the reports in the first two volumes were compiled prior to publication of these 
materials, while each preceding year’s cases were reported regularly thereafter with 
new details being added frequently. This may owe to the highly summarized format 
and brevity of the reports contained in the first volume. An example of one of the 
earliest cases reported in the series, “Government against Telok Sahoo and five 
Others,” dated March 18, 1805, reads as follows: 
 
The prisoners, whose trial came on at the Dacca Jelalpore ses-
sions[,] were arraigned on a charge of having robbed the house of 
Shekh Jogeen, and of having caused his death by applying fire to 
different parts of his body. This charge was fully established by 
their confessions as well as by the evidence adduced upon the trial; 
and they were declared by the law officers liable to exemplary pun-
ishment extending to death. They were accordingly sentenced by 
the Court of Nizamut Adawlut (present H. T. Colebrooke and J. 
Fombelle) to suffer death.36 
 
 The above quoted report, though one of the briefest in the volume, pro-
vides a template for how the earlier cases are narrated. Cases for later years, as I 
show, are replete with much greater detail and expand significantly in length. A 
given report usually starts with a charge from a particular circuit court trial outlin-
ing the basic features of the case. Usually this is followed by the opinion in the 
fatwa of the Muhammadan law officers of the circuit court, and whether the judge 
of that court concurred with this opinion. If the fatwa of the law officers of the 
Nizāmat ʻAdālat differs from the circuit court fatwa, then it is also summarized. 
The report is concluded by noting the judges who were present at the time, and 
Akhtar | Interpreting the Legal Archive 
  
193  
their verdict with reference to any specific punishment—either in agreement or 
disagreement with the fatwa—along with their opinion and reasoning. The cases 
in the first volume are briefly summarized, and rarely do they ever span over two 
pages.  
 
 
Invisibility of the Law Officers 
 
Unfortunately, the Muhammadan law officers, that is, the qadis, muftis, and maulavis, 
are nowhere listed by name, except the few rare instances where a reference ap-
pears in the footnotes. The disappearance of the law officers is significant to the 
changing modalities of a secularizing sacred law. Later on, their fatwas come to be 
contested by other evidence such as sooruthal reports of the police darogha, and 
postmortem reports of the medical officers, which point to evidence of the fact. 
This attests to the diminishing legal value of the fatwa in light of modern eviden-
tiary criteria. The law officers, however, remain a feature of some of the cases until 
the very end of the Nizāmat system, with occasional references to fatwas even in 
1859. The earlier court records judiciously summarize the fatwa of the law officers 
regardless of whether their opinion is final, and in their deliberations the judges 
make regular reference to this opinion. Later on, however, as becomes evident 
especially in the cases recorded in the sixth and final volume of the edition, there 
are cases where the Muhammadan law officers are scarcely mentioned, though 
their presence is required according to procedure. This erasure of the law officers 
is accompanied by other appearances and new forms of evidence. Exemplary of 
this trend is a case from 1850, where the circuit law officer’s fatwa is overridden 
by the testimony of a medical officer: 
 
The body was disinterred, an inquest duly held and an autopsy 
taken by Dr. Denham which he describes as follows: ‘The body 
presented, externally, marks of burns on the lower part of the back, 
but no marks of violence about the private parts. Internally there 
was a small portion of membranous substance in the cavity of the 
womb,…the deceased must have miscarried, and in all probability 
death was occasioned from the loss of blood.’37 
 
Hence medical facts are attested as visual facts in the legal documentation 
of court procedure—this process is described in more detail in the following sec-
tion. In several cases recorded toward the end of the compendium, neither the law 
officers nor their fatwas are mentioned in the records. By 1832 the Regulations 
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grant circuit court judges authority to override the fatwa according to discretion. 
Moreover, the absence of the voice of the qadis—who are possibly central charac-
ters in other instances of sharīʿa trials—in most of the court records where these 
individuals are present, suggests already a different type of procedure taking shape, 
along with its own textual conventions of inscription, documentary recording, and 
evidentiary criteria that accord the attention of the viewer of the record to different 
details. 
 
 
Maps, Diagrams, Genealogical Charts, and Foldouts 
 
The most visually distinct feature of the otherwise textual reports are charts, plots, 
and maps that are included as aids for the viewer. Occasional cases, especially those 
of highway robberies, or decoities as they were referred to by the British adminis-
trators, would include foldout pages that indicate where the gang had assembled 
in relation to where the infraction took place, and how they came to be appre-
hended. Complex cases would also include genealogical plots, or diagrams con-
necting different claimants, witnesses, and accused in relation to one another. 
These hand-drawn maps and plots that literally fold out of the pages of the reports 
also present new ways of seeing the colonial terrain over which the Company was 
administrating. In complex cases involving crimes that took place outside Com-
pany jurisdiction, and hence outside the purview of the Nizāmat, they would mark 
out borders, which would also visually represent legal boundaries. These markings 
and inscriptions can be read as texts that map out the law onto a visual terrain. 
Often evidentiary details would also be pointed out, including facts such as the 
distance between one village and another, making the alibi of the accused, or a 
statement of the witness, visually verifiable in wholly modern ways.  
 
 
Indexical Features of the Reports 
 
Originally intended to provide reference to colonial lawyers and judges of the 
courts, these features make the volumes accessible as a mode of categorization of 
case law in terms of principal matters seen as relevant at the time. These indexical 
features in the Reports provide vivid insights into ways of summarizing and catego-
rizing the law. In addition to the case records being logged in chronological order 
with margin summaries, each volume includes a table of the cases sorted by the 
defendant’s name. The case records also note which judges were present by name, 
by noting, for example “(present J. H. Harington and H. T. Colebrooke,)” for an 
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1805 case.38 At the end of the first two volumes, and at the beginning of the sixth, 
is a comprehensive index to principal matters and a collated list of cases in that 
volume by specification, that is, the crime in question. An index at the end of 
volume 5 collates principal matters from all previous volumes and provides an 
invaluable map distilling the records up to that point. The final volume of the 
Reports published as a coda in 1861 is itself an “Index to the first six volumes of 
the select reports of the Nizamut Adawlut, from 1805 to 1850.”39 The indexes 
compiled at the end of some of the volumes and at the end of the collection pro-
vide a visual map of legal change as it took place over the first half of the nine-
teenth century. It also shows a taxonomy of principal matters that appeared to be 
important at the time. 
The cases listed under the section “Evidence,” for instance, show all the 
principal cases wherein evidentiary criteria became a significant point of law, hence 
providing a map for relating the visible back to the articulable. Other indexical 
entries attest to the colonial lifeworld being seen through European eyes: index 
titles such as “British Subjects, European,” “British Subjects, Native,” “Europ-
eans,” “Female Infanticide,” “Human Sacrifice,” “Killing Sorcerers and Witches,” 
“Sodomy,” “Sorcerers,” “Whoredom,” and “Witchcraft” bring to light a colonial 
world striated and categorized by European interlocutors through their version of 
codified Islamic law. The Advertisement of this volume notes: “The enactment of 
the Indian Penal Code is not calculated to affect the value of the precedents em-
braced in this Index. On the contrary, it is believed that a reference to the decisions 
will materially assist those employed in the administration of criminal justice, even 
when the proceedings are regulated and punishments awarded in accordance with 
the new code.”40   
 
 
Interpreting “Discursive Residue” of Law as Archive of Visual Transformations 
 
Certain features of the Reports make them a rich resource for visualizing the process 
of legal change undergone in the transition from Islamic jurisprudence to Com-
pany law in the colonial period. Insofar as the changing factuality of the law is 
recorded by the Company’s own procedures, the Reports inadvertently also form 
an archive of the visual restructuring of colonial modernity. A key aspect is obvi-
ously the periodization from early to mid-nineteenth century where the heyday of 
British experimentation with sharīʿa law occurs. The term discursive residue is meant 
to signify that the recording processes of Company law outlive their own relevance 
to a legal system that has long since become antecedent—both the East 
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 India Company and its system of Anglo-Muhammadan law have ceased to exist. 
What does persist is their recording of legal facts in the moment that they were pro-
duced.41 Hence this residue is the materiality and textuality of the Reports, but also 
the fact that they form a “visual archive” of this changing factuality of the law. 
Where the institutional secretions of the court become crystallized, the Reports pro-
vide a visually rich archival record of myriad social experiments in penality and 
legal transformations precisely as they take shape.  
In the moment of crystallization of printed matter, the pages of the Reports 
record legal facts that become transformed into historical fact—after the fact. The 
registrar’s compiling the Reports also compiles antecedent terms as technical termi-
nology of Anglo-Muhammadan law adapted from sharīʿa and imprecisely translit-
erated into colonial vernacular. These italicized words (such as mouhurir, moonsif, 
sooruthal, razeenama, roobacaree) attest to forms of documentation that also officiated 
colonial law in technical terms adapted by Company jurists from local practice. 
The terms are italicized and hence appear as visual markers on the page of the 
Reports, alongside technical Latin terms (such as mens rea and in articulo mortis). These 
visual features of the text present markers on the page of cultural translation as it 
was taking place. Most interestingly, at times the Persian and Urdu text is repro-
duced within the body of the English records, usually witness testimonies, and 
even fatwas originally recorded in the local languages are translated into English 
for the record. However, very rarely, the Persian and Urdu script seeps back into 
the colonial record. The most interesting examples are included as illustrations (fig 
1, 2); these include a fatwa where the question from the British circuit judge is in 
Urdu, while the response of the mufti is in Persian. It is the only Persian fatwa 
found in the Reports, and as such bears testament to an antecedent artifact of the 
law while visually displaying precisely what the regulated law was, at the same time, 
erasing. 
The residue of the procedures of the law that is left over in the Reports thus 
records key moments of colonial legal change as it was taking place. The fact that 
the law is recording the law, regulated through the law itself, along with its own 
forms of recording, recoding, and regulation, bears testament to the fact that cer-
tain procedures came to be changed while evidencing the means through which 
these changes occurred. The residual discursive marks left behind form only a par-
tial view of lived legal reality of the time. However, in that partial view, much is to 
be gleaned and gathered as visibly significant evidence of changing ways of seeing, 
showing, and judging that can be visualized and partially reconstructed, after the 
fact of colonial modernity. 
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Figure 2 A rare example of a Niz̤āmat ’Adālat law officer’s fatwa reproduced in typographical 
Persian script. This may be the first and only time such Persian reinscription of the fatwa in 
question-answer format is rendered visible in the Reports. On the right is the Nizamat judge’s 
specific query to the law officer in Urdu. On the left is the law officer’s response in Persian. The 
asterisk marked footnote underneath stating the fatwa was unnecessary, suggests that this is al-
ready the end of an era. Niz ̤āmat ’Adālat, Reports of Cases Determined in the Court 
of Nizamut Adawlut [1831-1850], Calcutta: Bengal Military Orphan Press, 1841-
1852.  Image courtesy British Library Board (IOR/V/22/445, p. 32-33). 
 
 
Visual Transformations: Evidencing an Epistemological Rupture  
 
The previous section attended to the “form” and formatting of the Reports. In this 
section I attend more closely to the “content” of the Reports—specifically through 
a visual frame—to discern an onto-epistemological break taking shape through 
regulation of the law. This section shows how this rupture also comes to be rec-
orded within the medium of the law by its own production of factuality. The 
changing mode of visibilities and articulabilities are described in the various 
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modalities that become evident as we transition from decade to decade within the 
volumes of the Reports. 
 
 
Eyewitness Accounts and Testimonial Evidence 
 
In terms of content of the Reports, the cases recorded often provide rich visual 
material in the form of eyewitness testimonies, and descriptions of the crime that 
are revealed during the investigations. Islamic law places the greatest evidentiary 
value on eyewitness accounts and does not value circumstantial evidence beyond 
establishing certain culpability or suspicion. This evidentiary value on visual testi-
mony, however, is being outmoded during the same process in which the Reports 
are being assembled. New modes of inquiry and assessment of factual bases of 
crimes are coming into effect. However, as the importance is still laid on the fatwas 
of the law officers, at least in the earlier career of the Nizāmat, the eyewitness 
accounts are included in the records as corroborating evidence. The legally attested 
facts of what principal witnesses to the crime in question saw and the ways in 
which they describe it are logged in these cases and provide a rich visual-historical 
resource in terms of penal law. Often times, the eyewitness accounts don’t stand 
up to the criteria required by fiqh jurisprudential standards; however, the accounts 
are still included to establish circumstantial evidence and hence convict the perpe-
trators of the crime. On June 26, 1821, in the case of “Government against Hatim 
Ali,” the visual testimony of a boy becomes crucial in the matter of a murder of 
his mother having been committed by a man she was cohabiting with: 
 
It appeared also, from the statement of this boy, that on the morn-
ing on which the murder occurred, the prisoner came home before 
[sunrise], and desired the boy to leave the house, which he refusing 
[sic] to comply with, he threatened to beat him. The witness then 
left it, and went to the house of a woman named Chandoo, and did 
not return until after sunrise. Seeing no one, he looked through a 
hole in the wall, and observed the deceased apparently dead, of 
which he informed the Darogha. The Darogha immediately re-
paired to the house, and finding the door locked, made a smith 
wrench it open, when the body of the deceased was discovered 
lying partly on a charpai, with two saber wounds, weltering in blood, 
and the prisoner had absconded. Three days after, the prisoner was 
apprehended not far from the Thana, with his sword, which is said 
to have been stained with blood. He made no attempt to escape, 
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or any resistance.…Near the body of the deceased was found a 
chadur belonging to the prisoner, stained with spots of blood. …His 
sword is said to have had also marks of blood on it. …When the 
witnesses were examined before [the judge of circuit], and the 
sword shown them, they could not assert with certainty whether 
the marks on it were caused by blood or rust, but stated them to 
be precisely the same marks as were on it at the time of the pris-
oner’s apprehension.42  
 
Here the visual criteria of the case rest both on the testimony of the boy 
and on the marks on the sword, which allegedly belonged to the assailant. What 
was seen at the time, who it was seen by, and how they described the situation is 
logged in the Reports as legal fact; however, this descriptive content is refracted by 
ways of seeing developed during colonial legal modernity. A later case from 1827 
provides one of several examples where visual criteria, although not attestable as 
evidence according to rules of Islamic jurisprudence, is still employed by the Eu-
ropean judges as providing circumstantial evidence to the fact of the commission 
of the crime in question:  
 
It appeared in evidence, that on the 22d of February 1827, Buray 
the prosecutor’s nephew, a boy about 13 years of age, left his home 
early in the morning to tend some cattle, having on his person at 
the time certain gold and silver ornaments. …About 10 o’clock the 
same night, a shepherd named Hurgobind, observed to the Jema-
dar of the Chowkee, that he had seen the deceased in com-pany 
with the prisoner Nunheh at about 7 A.M. In consequence of this 
information he was apprehended, but denied the charge. …Several 
respectable witnesses deposed to the …facts, though no one ap-
peared to have actually seen the murder committed. …W. Dorin, 
(fourth Judge.) “The prisoner was seen on the very day in company 
with the murdered boy, who wore gold and silver orn-aments to 
the value of 125 rupees. On being taxed, and evasions, he indicated 
the well in which the body was found, and then produced the or-
naments of the boy from his own house, hid under some straw. 
There is no resisting the presumption that he murdered the boy, 
and I would pass a capital sentence.”43  
 
In this case, we can observe the way in which visual evidence provided by a shep-
herd is used by one of the judges of the Nizāmat to establish circumstantial 
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evidence of the crime having been committed, although no one had actually seen 
the crime take place. The fact that the prisoner was seen in such and such a place 
helped corroborate the facts during the investigation, and also in the passing of 
the final sentence. Later on, I examine how different ways of seeing come to be 
incorporated in the Reports, as judgments come to be made of different visual cri-
teria. 
 
 
Evidentiary Transformations (from Murder Weapon to Body of the Victim) 
 
One of the earliest, and possibly most substantial, change made by British admin-
istrators to sharia jurisprudence effected during Marquis Cornwallis’s Minute on 
the “defects of Muhumudan Law,” discussed in the first part of this essay, was to 
shift the criteria of evidence in homicide trials. The doctrine of Abu Hanifa was to 
be regularly overridden by the opinions of his two disciples Imam Yusuf and Mu-
hammad Al-Shaybani. This allowed the British to shift the investigation into mur-
der cases in evidentiary terms, from establishing guilt by assessing the type of 
weapon used, that is, whether this was a sharp metal object or one that could easily 
effect death, or was the object an unlikely murder weapon. The emerging doctrine 
allowed Company jurists to convince their Islamic law officers to pay attention to 
the murderer’s intent. Although this Regulation came into force in 1793, the earli-
est cases in the Reports from 1805 still pay attention to the murder weapon in the 
way the record is laid out. Later on, this changes as new modes of investigating 
and establishing crimes are outmoding the fiqh evidentiary criteria. One of the ear-
liest cases of “Vakeel of Government against Sonaram,” from January 1805, shows 
what the colonial recorders of the case are paying attention to in a moment while 
points of codified law are still being formed:  
 
The prisoner, charged at the Backergunge sessions with the murder 
of Kusoola, his wife, by striking her on the head with the handle 
of a hatchet, pleaded “not guilty.” By the concurrent testimony of 
several witnesses, who were examined in support of the prosecu-
tion, it appeared that the prisoner, after a quarrel with his wife, in 
which she gave him abuse, and he beat her, was found standing 
near the body of the deceased, with a hatchet in his hand; and that, 
on being interrogated by them, he confessed that he had killed the 
deceased by striking her on the head with the handle of the hatchet. 
From the inquest holden on the body of the deceased, it also ap-
peared that she had received a severe contusion and wound on the 
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back of the head. …The law officers of the Nizamut Adawlut, con-
sidering [it] being uncertain, from the instrument used, that the 
death of the deceased was intended by the prisoner, declared retal-
iation for willful homicide to be barred; but that the prisoner was 
liable to discretionary punishment.44 
 
The “handle of a hatchet” is referred to on several occasions during this 
otherwise terse record, because it becomes a determining factor in the case. A 
point that makes it even more significant is the fact that the Islamic law offices use 
this fact as a point of uncertainty on whether willful homicide was intended by the 
assailant. While this point of the law had already been regulated, we can note the 
onto-epistemological terms (knowing facts through objects as they come to be 
described in relation to the crime) in a moment of flux. To be sure, a footnote 
marked with an asterisk is appended to this record.  
 
It may be added, upon the futwa of the law officers, in this case, 
that death, occasioned by a blow given with the wooden handle of 
an axe, or any similar instrument, is not considered by the Moo-
hummudan lawyers to be willful homicide; nor is it by Aboo 
Huneefah, if the blow were struck with the iron back of the instru-
ment. But Aboo Yoosuf and Imam Moohummud maintain it to be 
equally murder, whether occasioned by the iron back of such an 
instrument, or by the edge of it.45 
 
Here we can note the degree of detail accorded to the object, whether it 
was metallic or sharp, and whether the blow was struck with the edge or with the 
handle. This allows the determination of the crime on two distinct epistemological 
levels, that is, of the Regulations, as well as that of the classical Hanafite doctrine. 
We may note also that the “inquest holden on the body of the deceased” is also 
mentioned, but in nowhere near as much detail as is accorded to the instrument 
with which the murder was perpetrated. This evidentiary criteria will shift from the 
instrument to the body in the coming decades over which the Reports are tabulated. 
A decade later, a case of “Vakeel of Government against Pedro Gomez,” for the 
charge of “Murder by Strangulation,” from January 14, 1816, already shows this 
shift of the juridical gaze toward the body as having taken place, though the epis-
temological and documentary terms are still lacking in the vivid description the 
body acquires in later decades. 
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It appeared from evidence, that the prisoner married the deceased 
about three years before the murder. ...The prisoner confessed at 
the Thana, that he had strangled the deceased. …Before the Mag-
istrate [the prisoner] stated, that, on the evening before [his wife’s] 
death, the deceased attempted to run away from his house; that he 
bound her hand and foot, to prevent her flight; and that a snake 
bit her in the night, and caused her death. On his trial he simply 
denied the murder, and said that she died from the bite of a snake. 
…On the inquest held on the body, there were marks of a rope 
found on the neck, but no signs of the bite of a snake, and the 
prisoner was unable to prove that she had been bitten by a snake. 
The futwas of the law officers of the Court of Circuit, and Nizamut 
Adawlut convicted the prisoner of willful murder of his wife by 
strangulation, and the Court of Nizamut Adawlut, (present J. Fom-
belle,) concurring in the conviction, sentenced the prisoner to suf-
fer death.46 
 
In this case, the evidence gathered from the inquest held on the body dur-
ing the initial investigation is used to disprove the accused’s statement about a 
snake bite. While marks of rope were identified on the body, the rope itself does 
not become an object of the case record in so much detail. Later records show 
how greater detail in terms of the visible becomes accorded to both the inquest 
and the body in determining facts of the crime.  
 
 
Inquest of the Body: “The Sooruthal Report”  
 
The later records forwarded by the circuit judge to the Nizāmat incur a visible shift 
in details that are included. Particularly after the 1830s, the police files, reports 
from the thanna (police station) filed by the darogah (inspector), are awarded signif-
icant space. The documentary evidence forwarded from the initial inquest in mur-
der and homicide trials is an attested document known as the “sooruthal report”—
the colonial accent on the Persian (surat-e-hal) would roughly translate to “present 
state of affairs,” while surat itself literally means visible appearance. The sooruthal 
report, which would be confirmed by the eyewitnesses, documents facts immedi-
ately discernable from the scene of the crime as encountered and recorded by the 
darogah. We can note the detailed ways in which the wounds on the victim’s corpse 
are described in this report included in a record from December 31, 1840: 
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There being no doubt as to the cause of the death of Ashruff, the 
body, after being inspected by the police and an inquest held 
thereon, was buried on the spot. The witnesses, Bhyrub Chunder 
Ghose and Jeedhun, Nos. 19 and 20, have authenticated the 
sooruthal. The wounds of Musst. Nooree are described in the in-
quest held on them by the police, on the 26th of June, at the thanna, 
to have consisted of one wound on the right arm, 9 fingers in 
length, 2 ½ in breadth, and 1 ½ in depth and to have been cut to 
the bone;  another wound above it, 6 fingers long, 1 broad and 
deep; a wound on the neck under the left ear, 3 fingers long, ½ 
broad, and about the depth of a grain of corn; a wound under the 
left shoulder, 2 ½ fingers long, ½ a finger broad and deep; one 
wound extending from the back of the neck across the left shoul-
der blade, one span long, about 3 fingers in breadth towards the 
middle, and about 2 fingers at each end cut to the bone; and the 
fingers of both hands slightly cut in several places. The witnesses 
Naimut Khan and Hazee Buxoolllah, Nos. 21 and 22, have authen-
ticated the above.47 
 
In contrast to the earlier records, where seldom an inquest or the body is 
mentioned, these later records provide detailed descriptions of the marks on the 
body. This signals to a different way of seeing and attesting to the truth as estab-
lished in the earliest instance of encountering a violent crime. In a case from 1857, 
the sooruthal report is still being employed to gather immediate facts of the crime; 
however, the unit of measurement has now shifted to the more standardized inch, 
which suggests an epistemological shift taking place in how facts are recorded: 
  
The darogah went to the spot, and held the usual sooruthal and dis-
covered two severe wounds on the person of the deceased, one of 
the left side of the throat, two inches in length, one in breadth and 
one and a half in depth, and another on the cheek, from the top of 
the ear to the chin, about five inches long, one inch broad, and one 
inch deep, and saw the prisoner’s bed in a bloody state.48 
 
In one of the last cases in the Reports from 1859, their point of terminus, 
we find the sooruthal report being a central feature of case reports, which have now 
become inflated with much detail. In this case, however, there is a problem of 
attestation of the report, which causes the circuit judge to censure the darogah in 
his letter to the Nizāmat. In doing so, the judge also describes the modality and 
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operation of the sooruthal report and the fact that it had by then superseded eye-
witness accounts and testimonial evidence: 
 
In examining witnesses to the sooruthal instead of looking into the 
attestation of that document, the Magistrates are in the habit of 
questioning the witnesses as to what they saw on the occasion of 
the inquest. …the essence of a sooruthal is its being the intelligent 
and full record of what has transpired at an inquest, set down by 
an officer who is…experienced in such matters and understanding 
what is material, and what is otherwise. This record made on the 
spot at the time, and assented to by the subscribing witnesses, 
forms a permanent history of the circumstances which cannot vary 
and which can be relied on by the Court. Whereas to substitute for 
the written record, the random recollections of the witnesses, is to 
substitute danger for safety, uncertainty for certainty, I should 
therefore be glad to see the police stimulated to greater care in the 
legal preparation of these documents, and the Magistrates advised 
to pay attention to their proper attestation.49 
 
 
Postmortem Report and Medical Examination 
 
The epistemic shift underway in terms of evidentiary criteria finally appears to 
crystallize with the appearance of “medical evidence” in the records. In addition,  
to the sooruthal report, the postmortem report conducted by a medical officer such 
as the civil assistant surgeon would provide forensic information after the fact. 
The criteria and description of evidence based on what this officer finds in the 
autopsy examination are of an entirely different nature. A medical report cited in 
this case from January, 31, 1859, describes the corpse as such: 
 
The evidence of the Civil Assistant Surgeon shows that the beating 
must have been severe, bruises and extravasated blood being found 
on the scalp, back, neck, loins, and even on the abdomen and 
knees. Considerable force must have been exerted and, in all prob-
ability, some stick or blunt weapon was employed. But this beating, 
though more severe than the witnesses would make out, was not 
sufficient to cause death, which was caused by pressure on the 
windpipe, the face and eyes presenting all these appearances which 
usually result from strangulation, though there was not a trace of a 
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rope outside the neck, nor had the tongue protruded, as it would 
have done had the woman hung herself. The woman was quite 
healthy otherwise, and there was no trace of disease about her such 
as the prisoner hinted at before the police or the Magis-trate. The 
witnesses to the sooruthal also speak of the marks of severe beating. 
But the medical evidence is obviously of the greatest importance 
in a case like this.50 
 
While doctors and surgeons are referred to even in earlier records, the Reports be-
come riddled with appearances of postmortem reports and autopsies of the corpse 
from 1840 on. This forms the basis of a medico-juridical evidentiary criteria that 
can offset eyewitness accounts, as well as the hermeneutical reasoning of the law 
officers’ fatwas into contestation through a distinctly scientific epistemic frame. A 
case from January 24, 1857, marks a clear rupture: 
 
The civil assistant surgeon, who held a post mortem examination of 
the deceased’s death to have been caused by rupture of the liver 
and spleen; that there were contusions all over the body, more es-
pecially on the sides of the chest and belly, and that these contu-
sions and ruptures were apparently the result of violence; that he 
cannot exactly state what might have been the result of those inju-
ries if the spleen and liver had not been ruptured, but that the de-
ceased was, from the state of her body, which presented a mass of 
bruises, dreadfully beaten, and that she might have possibly lived 
two or three hours or even longer. …it has been clearly deposed 
by the civil assistant surgeon that the deceased met her death by 
violence, the body on examination presenting a mass of bruises 
and both the liver and spleen were ruptured, the former of which 
was in a healthy condition, and this leads me to believe that great 
force must have been used to cause the rupture.51   
 
By the 1850s, the epistemic shift brought about in Islamic penal jurispru-
dence by East India Company jurists appears to have restructured the visuality of 
seeing and knowing in terms of scientific fact. That this takes place before the 
enactment of the Indian Penal Code of 1860 is highly significant, for this shift has 
taken place endogenously to Islamic criminal jurisprudence by various means and 
not caused by the overhaul of the legal system as would commonly be assumed. 
The dominant position of medical knowledge can be further ascertained by the 
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summarized entry of a record found under the heading “Evidence Medical” in the 
final volume, or Index, of the Reports:  
 
Held that if prisoners charged with murder wish to impugn the 
accuracy of the opinion given by the Medical Officer, making the 
post mortem examination, they should summon medical evidence 
before the Session Judge, for the purpose of contradicting that 
opinion on a fact deposed to by the officer making the post mortem exam-
ination, but this Court, when that officer’s evidence is unopposed by 
any scientific evidence to a contrary effect, cannot venture itself to apply 
doctrines laid down in text books on medical jurisprudence to the 
particular facts deposed to by the Medical Officer, but will accept 
this officer’s opinion as to the immediate cause of death.52 
 
From the weapon to the body, from eyewitness accounts to circumstantial 
evidence, from testament to document—we have witnessed a visual transform-
ation of evidentiary proofs. The primary knowledge and interpretive expertise of 
the Muhammadan law officers initially become displaced by other visual-discursive 
evidentiary criteria, and eventually superseded by an altogether different layer of 
medical and forensic factuality. It should be clear from this visual survey of the 
evidentiary form of the Reports how their discursive residue provides a clear-cut 
map and index of a visual restructuring within a legal archive of colonial modernity. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Having surveyed the changes in form and content of the Reports from 1805 to 
1859, we have witnessed an epistemic rupture whereby visibilities and articulabili-
ties of law and life in the colonial realm come to be restructured in terms of each 
other. Islamic hermeneutic reasoning, ways of seeing and bearing witness to the 
truth, are thus displaced by modern forms of reason, inflected by colonial regula-
tion. If law structures life, then the regulation of law itself comes to restructure the 
ways in which the visuality of law comes to be articulated. New formats and pro-
cedures determine what is made apparent, and through what means. The shifting 
epistemological bases of truth-production through law, penality, and evidentiary 
procedure can be discerned in visible traces the law leaves behind through its own 
recording operations. Traversing across such historical strata of legal history can 
illuminate these traces that highlight the breaks and ruptures in ways of seeing and 
saying, in terms of the visible and the articulable. To return to Deleuze’s refraction 
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of the Foucauldian optics of the subject and the institution, of discourses and prac-
tices:   
 
The expression also has a form and a substance: for example the 
form is penal law and the substance is ‘delinquency’ in so far as it 
is the object of statements. Just as penal law as a form of expres-
sion defines a field of sayability (the statements of delinquency), so 
prison as a form of content defines a place of visibility.53 
 
In considering the Reports as an archive of penal law, we consider the Fou-
cauldian technique of discerning articulabilities in an entirely distinct legal lifeworld 
of the colonial subject of law, which provides us a vantage point and perspective 
on modernity distinct from the transformations of European mod-ernity.   
 
For example, ‘in the classical age’ the asylum emerged as a new way 
of seeing and displaying madmen, a way that was very different 
from that of the Middle Ages or the Renaissance; while for its part 
medicine—but equally law, rules and regulations, literature, etc.—
invented a system of statements concerning the new concept of 
folly.54  
 
In colonial Bengal we may note how similar types of regulatory modalities shift 
the principles of articulation of an entirely different lifeworld than European strata, 
which is also in itself entirely modern. 
 
If seventeenth-century statements wrote of madness as being the 
last degree of folly (a key notion), then the asylum or internment 
envelops it in a general concept uniting madmen, vagabonds, pau-
pers, idlers and all sorts of depraved folk: this offers a certain ‘self-
evidence,’ a historical perception or sensibility, as much as a dis-
cursive system. And later, under different conditions, it is prison 
that provides a new way of seeing and displaying crime, and delin-
quency a new way of saying.55 
 
What we have witnessed above is a transposition of these modern ways of 
seeing and saying that were themselves novel in Europe. In colonial modernity, 
however, this transposition produces altogether distinct ways of seeing and saying 
that still persist. As the entire system of Anglo-Muhammadan law itself came to 
an abrupt end marked by the rupture of codified British law in 1860, pursuing the 
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Reports to reconstruct a cartography of visual change may provide a more colorful 
testimony to the operations of antecedent system onto the visibilities and articula-
bilities of the colonial.  
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